Uncovering the Complexities of Predictive Travel Surveillance
The Unseen World of Data Sharing and Surveillance
In March 2020, Frank van der Linde, a Dutch citizen known for his advocacy in human rights, stood at the immigration line for European Union citizens at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport. Having returned from a trip outside the EU, he underwent what seemed like a routine immigration check. Linde, however, was unaware that his answers during this inspection were being recorded and forwarded to a Dutch public prosecutor who was monitoring his movements.
Linde's ordeal began with a data exchange that occurs frequently when people travel to destinations, including the United States and much of Europe. Here, airlines share detailed personal information about travelers with governments, data that can be retained for years and is crucial for tech companies developing algorithms to control border-crossings.
From Activism to Surveillance
Linde is known for his outspoken stances on issues like homelessness, anti-racism, and pacifism. Since 2017, he has been secretly flagged by Dutch police under a counter-terrorism program in Amsterdam. Despite being removed from this watchlist in 2019 and receiving an apology from Amsterdam's mayor, his movements continued to be closely monitored. His suspicions deepened when he discovered he had been placed on an international travel alert, leading him to question if his travel data was being used for surveillance purposes.
Passenger Name Records: A Digital Trail
In October 2022, Linde sought to access his flight records, known as Passenger Name Records (PNR). These PNRs, which airlines send to destination countries 48 to 72 hours before departure, contain various details—from contact information and travel itineraries to sensitive payment methods. Linde's quest revealed that even years after traveling, data remains accessible and potentially subject to misuse.
The Extent of Data Sharing
By December 2022, Linde received 17 travel records from the Dutch Passenger Information Unit. They initially claimed no third-party data sharing had occurred, but Linde was unconvinced and filed an appeal. In March 2023, the government admitted to sharing his PNR data thrice with border police, indicating larger oversight mechanisms at play.
Flawed Data and Future Implications
Upon examining his PNR records, Linde discovered inaccuracies—some flights were unrecorded, and others never happened, including a supposed flight to Belfast he never boarded. This surfaced concerns over data analysis and surveillance. As Linde questioned, “What do companies do with the data? If commercial companies help to analyze data that’s incorrect, you could draw all kinds of conclusions.” The experience highlights potential pitfalls of predictive surveillance reliant on flawed data, posing broader questions on privacy and data integrity.